Introduction. As a result of the acceleration of the pace of industrialization in the 1930s. The Soviet Union was able to strengthen its economic and military potential and become a powerful military power. However, for the Soviet state in the second half of the 1930s there was a real threat of war on two fronts - against Japan in Asia and against Germany in Europe.

The rise to power of the Nazis in Germany was the event that changed the vector of development of international relations and made the threat of a new war quite real. Germany has consistently pursued a course to violate the Versailles Agreements, namely, to rearm and militarize as soon as possible and change the existing state of affairs in Europe. In 1935, the number of German armed forces reached almost 500 thousand people and thereby exceeded the limits set by the Treaty of Versailles. On October 25, 1936, a military-political agreement was concluded between Italy and Germany, on October 26, 1936. Japan and Germany signed the "Anti-Comintern Pact". In turn, France and England pursued a policy of "appeasement" of Germany, as evidenced by the Munich agreements of 1938. Germany's revanchist plans were obvious, but they did not meet with a proper rebuff from the leading European powers. As a result of the acceleration of the pace of industrialization in the 1930s. The Soviet Union was able to strengthen its economic and military potential and become a powerful military power. For the Soviet state in the second half of the 1930s. there was a real threat of war on two fronts – against Japan in Asia and against Germany in Europe.

Methods. When studying migrants in the USSR in the first half of the twentieth century, a systematic approach was used, taking into account a wide range of political, economic, social, national and psychological factors to assess the process and a comprehensive study of the phenomena under consideration. . The research is based on the basic principles of historical knowledge, such as historiography, objectivity and science. An important part of this article is the work of foreign scientists and specialists. The research uses methods of collecting, analyzing and analyzing interstate documents and articles of historians.

Discussion. The source basis of the research work was considered at conferences and dissertations held in Russia. Such sources include the Code of laws of the USSR and scientific collections. Some articles have been published in foreign scientific publications. The results of the study were presented and discussed in the form of reports at the meetings of the Department of World History, the Institute of History and Ethnology named after Ch.Ch. Valikhanov.

In general, the murder of Kirov in 1934 was a signal for a new wave of repression. On the same day, the decree of the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR "On the procedure for conducting cases on the preparation or commission of terrorist acts" was adopted, which significantly reduced the legal guarantees of the rights of the accused in this category of cases (Collected Laws of the USSR of 1931 No. 69, item 459). The terms of the investigation were reduced to 10 days, the indictment was supposed to be handed to the accused 1 day before the trial, in which the cases were considered without the participation of the parties (i.e. without a prosecutor and a lawyer). Cassation appeals and petitions for pardon were not allowed, and the sentence to the highest measure had to be carried out immediately. A similar procedure was introduced on September 14, 1937 and in cases of sabotage and sabotage. The maximum term of imprisonment in cases of State crimes was increased from 10 to 25 years. The cases of persons brought to justice on political charges began to be dealt with out of court with the use of capital punishment. Given the large number of such cases, at Molotov's suggestion, the punishment was carried out according to lists. The special meeting began to act not in full, as stipulated by law, but in the form of a "3 judges", and then a “2 judges": the People's Commissar of the PKIF (first Yezhov, and then Beria) and the prosecutor of the USSR (Vyshinsky). On November 4, 1934, another resolution was adopted and it concerned political emigrants: "On work among the German population." It noted that anti-Soviet elements allegedly intensified among the Germans, and meanwhile, local party organizations and PKIF bodies react extremely weakly to these facts, in fact, allow connivance, completely incorrectly believing that our international policy requires these indulgences to Germans or other nationalities living in the USSR and violating elementary loyalty to the Soviet government. In a circular letter, the Central Committee demanded that republican and local organizations streamline the registration of party members within three months, check the correctness of information about those included in party documents and "clear the ranks of the CPSU of crooks, crooks and attached elements." (Manukyan, 2014: 103-104)

It should be noted, however, that despite the "mass hysteria of the search for "enemies of the people", fascists and spies," cases of sabotage and subversive activities by foreigners on the territory of the Soviet Union did take place. Already in 1933, the USPM had information about the conduct of sabotage and reconnaissance work by German intelligence at the defense enterprises of the USSR. Foreign nationals who worked at these enterprises transferred the most important military materials to Germany.

Against the background of the growing threat of war, foreign specialists who worked at that time at particularly important industrial enterprises of the country, which also included the Stalingrad factories: ‘STF’, “Krasny Oktyabr” and “Barricades”, were under close attention. And since Germany was considered by the Soviet leadership as an enemy in a future war, the Germans, first of all, became the object of close attention of the state security agencies.

According to the information of the PKIF of the Stalingrad region, anti-Soviet foreign citizens living in Stalingrad organized a counterrevolutionary Trotskyist group at the Stalingrad Tractor Factory, numbering 29 participants, in connection with which a series of arrests began in 1936. In this group, from among the most hostile to the leaders of the party and the government of the USSR, a terrorist core consisting of 11 people was singled out, ready to "take personal part in a terrorist act against the leaders of the party and government."

All of them were found guilty of committing crimes under Articles 58, paragraphs 1, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, namely: espionage, conducting counter-revolutionary and terrorist activities, propaganda or agitation, containing calls for the overthrow, undermining or weakening of Soviet power (Art. 58 paragraphs 1, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR as amended in 1926).

The organizer of the counterrevolutionary Trotskyist group at the STF was considered to be Kunt Alfred, born in 1904. The investigative file No. 8472 contains the following personal information about Kunt: "A native of Berlin, Germany, a German, a citizen of the USSR, non-partisan, a former member of the CPG, in 1923-1927 and in 1929-1932, a locksmith, social status – a worker, graduated from a folk school and 2 years of technical school, has no criminal record, has no awards, did not serve in the Red Army, did not serve in the White Army, since 1925 a member of the Trotskyist organization, lives in Stalingrad, arrived in the USSR in February 1932. through the IOAFR as a political emigrant, the father is a worker (tinker)".

During the search, a "heimatshine" (certificate of citizenship) was seized from him. Kunth admitted that after Hitler's coup he intended to return to Germany. Despite the fact that he was a member of the CPG and a political emigrant, he did not expect any retaliatory measures from the National Socialists, since he believed that he would fall under the Hindenburg amnesty.

As a result of numerous interrogations and confrontations, "the investigation established" that since 1925 Kunt had been "an active participant in the Trotskyist opposition in Germany and in December 1931 in Berlin was recruited by K.B. Berman-Yurin to conduct a counter-revolutionary operation on the territory of the USSR on behalf of the Trotskyist center in Berlin, headed by Trotsky's son L. Sedov. terrorist work". Having agreed to personally participate in the terrorist act against Stalin, Alfred Kunt undertook: To deliver to the USSR and hand over to a member of the counterrevolutionary Trotskyist terrorist center I.N. To Smirnov, Trotsky's directives to existing Trotskyist organizations in the USSR about a new terrorist course of struggle against the leaders of the party and the Soviet government.

During the investigation, it was established that Alfred Kunt conducted espionage activities in favor of Germany. Alfred Kunt used members of the counterrevolutionary Trotskyist group to obtain espionage information. Kunt was supposed to collect information about the work of the STF, special secret workshops, their equipment and products, about the political sentiments of foreigners and about the sentiments of Soviet citizens. As evidence of Kunt's terrorist propaganda, the testimony of Berman-Yurin was attached to the case, according to which "Alfred Kunt had to stay in the Soviet Union in order to carry out Trotskyist work among German and other political emigrants there. He was instructed to create a Trotskyist group in the Union, which could later be used for terrorist purposes."

The case of Kunt, like other foreigners, was heard in a closed court session, without the participation of the prosecution and defense parties, as well as without calling witnesses. According to the circular of the People's Commissariat of Justice and the Prosecutor of the USSR dated January 8, 1937, cases in which military, diplomatic or state secrets could be disclosed were considered by military tribunals without the participation of the prosecution and defense. This category included cases on charges of treason, espionage, sabotage and terror.

According to the indictment dated August 7, 1937 in investigative case No. 8472, Alfred Kunt fully pleaded guilty to counter-revolutionary Trotskyist, terrorist and espionage activities, “during the investigation he was convicted by the testimony of Otto Vollenbruch, Otto Liebenau and other members of the counter-revolutionary group”, his testimonies at the preliminary investigation confirmed. In the last word, Kunt stated that he repented of everything and asked the court to save his life. However, according to the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, on August 16, 1937, Alfred Kunt was shot. (Rezanenko O.O. 2018: 159-165)

Some historians also point to two more important directive letters issued by the PKIF GUGB in early 1937 and which had a great influence on the course of future repressions against political emigrants from Germany. The first of them (No. 12 of February 14) is entitled "On the terrorist, sabotage and espionage activities of the German Trotskyists, carried out on the instructions of the Gestapo on the territory of the USSR", the second (No. 26 of April 2, 1937) - "On the increasing activity of German intelligence bodies and special institutions of the fascist party (the foreign and foreign policy departments of the Anti-Comintern, the intelligence service of security detachments, and so on) on the territory of the USSR. The multi-page "Orientation on the Activities of the German Fascists in the USSR" attached to it already sounded a formidable characterization of the activities of the German fascists as "... typical of the pre-war period" - in other words, an assessment of the general political situation as practically "pre-war".

The beginning of the "German operation" dates back to Stalin's note, attached to the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 20, 1937: "All Germans from our military, paramilitary and chemical plants, at power plants and construction, in all areas, arrest everyone." He also drew up a draft decision with his own hand: Yezhov was ordered to immediately proceed with the arrest of all Germans who worked at defense factories, and the expulsion of some of them abroad, about which to report daily to the Central Committee.

Yezhov issued the PKIF Operational Order No. 00439 on the German operation on July 25 - an order that opened a whole era of mass contingent (mainly national) operations that affected both "his" citizens and foreigners of the corresponding nationality. German subjects, "settled" in defense enterprises and railways, were qualified in this order as infiltrated agents of the German General Staff and the Gestapo, prepared for sabotage activities for the period  of the war. Within five days (starting from July 29) all of them were ordered to be arrested, including those who had already quit their jobs. But, in comparison with Stalin's initiating note, the task of the operation is significantly narrowed: it is no longer about everyone and everything. Only German citizens, wherever they worked, as well as former German citizens who took Soviet citizenship and previously worked at defense facilities.

The general task of liquidating the "spy-sabotage base" in the USSR leads to the problem of repression not only against German citizens, but also against other foreign citizens and their associations, one way or another connected with foreign countries. It is divided into operations along separate national "lines", and three of them were pivotal - Polish, Harbin and German.

The "Polish" operation was promoted at intervals of two weeks after the "German" one. The corresponding order (No. 00485) was issued on August 11, and on August 15 the “operation” itself began. The number of victims in the Polish operation quickly ran into the thousands, and "the intensity of arrests and executions grew here every week." At the same time, apparently, an order was being prepared for the Harbin residents, which (for No. 00593) will be issued on September 20.

Prior to the beginning of the Great Terror, the procedure for arresting foreigners was somewhat different from the procedure for arresting Soviet citizens: for each such arrest or search, the sanction of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs or his deputy was required. They also determined the jurisdiction of the case and sent them either to the court, or to the tribunal, or to the Military Collegium. If as a measure of social protection it was supposed to be deported abroad by decision of the Special Conference, then it was preferable to do without arrest at all.

The "Great Terror" left little of these rules: coordination with Moscow during arrests and searches was no longer required. As in the case of Soviet citizens, collective lists, or "albums" were introduced: not separate cases, but "albums", and not even "albums", but lists of those already arrested should be sent to the center, while the actually compromising materials with such a volume of work the center did not ask (only in relation to foreign diplomats, the "archaic" procedure has not changed). A sufficient and necessary condition for compromise was already belonging to the contingent being developed, in this case, to foreign nationals and, first of all, to citizens of Germany, Poland, Italy and Japan - countries that were perceived as the most likely opponents in a future war. Expulsion abroad was still practiced, but starting from the summer of 1937, it was usually preceded by an arrest.

In relation to the "German operation" of 1937-1938, the earliest of the statistical reports of the PKIF identified by N. Okhotin and A. Roginsky refer to November 16, 1937 - 2536 convicts in "landscape order" throughout the country. A month later, there were already 5,805 of them, of which 85% (4,921 people) were in Ukraine (mainly in the Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk and Zhytomyr regions) and another 11% in Moscow and Leningrad. But here, we recall, the objects of repression were not foreigners, but citizens of the USSR.

Repressions against foreigners in the USSR developed in several directions, indicated by N. Okhotin and A. Roginsky. The first (and main!) is the purposeful administrative “squeezing out” of foreigners from the USSR (a kind of “cleansing” of the homeland), the second is the actual isolation of foreign diplomatic missions in the USSR, and the third is the arrests of foreigners, in particular, German citizens.

The signal for "squeezing out" was Yezhov's letter to the Politburo dated March 1937, which spoke of the use by foreign (mainly German) intelligence for espionage and sabotage of representatives of German firms and specialists of foreign nationals working in enterprises and institutions of the West Siberian Territory. The Politburo decided: "To deny foreigners living in the West Siberian Territory (when extending a residence permit) the right to further reside in the West Siberian Territory. First of all, to carry out this event in relation to German, Japanese and Polish citizens." But a month later, the same task was set as a strategic one for all local PKIF: “To carry out operational and preventive measures within six months aimed at removing all German subjects and all foreign subjects from the USSR who are more or less suspicious of espionage and counterrevolutionary work. The very posing of the question of the removal of all subjects of Germany without exception, a country with which the USSR was not at war, is amazing. (Polyan P.M., Glezer O.B. 2004)

At the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in 1937, Stalin put forward the thesis: as we move towards socialism, the class struggle will become more and more aggravated, designed to justify arbitrariness and mass repression. Stalin established personal control over the organs of state security. He directly gave instructions to Yezhov, and then to Beria, about the arrests (V. Kolyazin, 1997: 24). So, on the testimony of one arrested person, he wrote: “T. Yezhov, the persons I have marked in the text with the letters “ar.” should be immediately arrested, if they have not yet been arrested. I. Stalin. In July 1937, by order of July 25, 1937, the PKIF began an operation to identify and systematically exterminate spies. All citizens had to participate in the class struggle and in every possible way contribute to the identification and detention of spies, enemies of Soviet society. The Soviet leadership called: "All officials and citizens are obliged to provide the employee in whose name the warrant is issued, full assistance for successful completion.". The "special policy" of the top Soviet leadership also affected political emigrants. German political emigrants were under special supervision. For each foreigner living or temporarily staying in the USSR, the so-called "operational materials" and "card file of contacts" were started. On the basis of such documents, a verdict was issued on how pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet this or that foreigner was. Surveillance was carried out on almost all those arriving from abroad, the accumulated material was collected in "operational-investigative cases." (Manukyan, 2014: 104-405)

Surveillance was carried out, on the one hand, by the secret services, on the other hand, by informants who were assigned to each German emigrant (translators, guides, work colleagues, etc.) home step of political emigrants. Similar cases were started both against ordinary German political emigrants and against the most proven communists and internationalists:

The investigation used similar cases during this period. Many German émigrés were charged with "pro-fascist agitation of a defeatist nature" and "counter-revolutionary activities among the emigres." As the main appearances of foreign agents in all the "scriptures" of the PKIF, Moscow theaters were presented, and certainly the Bolshoi Theater.

The Stalinist leadership realized that they were taking an unprecedented step, leaving the West, and especially those who sympathized with the USSR in the West, to doubt the democratic nature of the Soviet state. But these measures, despite the possible undermining of the authority of the USSR in the eyes of sympathetic forces in Europe, made it possible to get rid of "dissenters". The purges led to a split among political emigrants. The "special line" towards political emigrants, pursued by the Soviet leadership, led to a sharp change in the mood of the Germans who ended up in the USSR. (Manukyan M.N. 2014: 106)

Apparently, the “squeezing out” of foreigners by refusing to renew their residence permits in the spring and summer of 1937, if it happened, was not very active, mainly concerning border or regime areas. But the era of mass operations that began already in August immediately brought the problem of foreigners to the fore. By the end of August, a concise and capacious circular of the PKIF "On Foreigners" (No. 68 of 08/22/1937) was developed, rigidly postulating: "the vast majority of foreigners living in the USSR are the organizing principle of espionage and sabotage." In this way, he presented foreigners as a single "hostile" category and had a strong influence on the entire course of the "great terror". Historians also determined the tactics of "squeezing out" them: by refusing to renew their residence permits after their expiration, by issuing exit visas to them. First of all, this applied to citizens of Germany, Poland, Japan, Italy, Austria, Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Holland, Denmark, Cuba, Latvia, Lithuania, Manchukuo, Mexico, Romania, Finland, Switzerland, Estonia, Yugoslavia , in the second (in the presence of compromising data) - to the subjects of England, France, the USA, Spain, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Iran, Afghanistan, China and Greece.

Beginning in the summer of 1937, the practice of expelling foreigners abroad also changed: now, as a rule, to be sure, it was preceded by arrest. In particular, the vast majority of already arrested German citizens were expelled.

However, the main target of the German, Polish and all foreign operations of 1937-1938 were still not foreign, but their own citizens of "foreign" nationalities, marked by various "colors" of suspicion. The combination of such a marked "colour" with the "wrong" nationality, as noted by N. Okhotin and A. Roginsky, was enough for arrest, but most often this combination led to administrative repression - dismissal and subsequent expulsion.

Examples of administrative persecution based on ethnicity were mass "ethnic" layoffs from defense industry enterprises, as well as from the army. So, according to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov 200sh of June 24, 1938, military personnel of all "nationalities that are not part of the Soviet Union", including Germans, as well as all those born or living abroad, as well as having relatives there, were subject to dismissal from the Red Army. (Decree of the Politburo  March 23, 1938 Protocol N° 59. )

A special and very interesting question is the contingent of the so-called "former foreign citizens" who have passed into Soviet citizenship. As N. Okhotin and A. Roginsky note, in different contexts they could appear both as foreigners, and as Soviet citizens, and as stateless persons (or as "persons without citizenship"). So, in the investigation cases of political emigrants, practically all of them appear as Soviet citizens, which in reality was far from being the case. (Polyan P.M., Glezer O.B. 2004).

Mass arrests caused alarm, doubt and anxiety. At first, the attitude of emigrants towards arrests was rather calm, each arrested by the PKIF was considered by them as a spy, as Soviet propaganda strenuously spoke about. The materials for the Central Committee of the IOAFR noted: “Last year (meaning 1937), the attitude towards the relatives of the arrested Germans was like fascists and spies.” (RSASPH F. 495. I 292. C 101. P. 10.). However, from the middle of 1938, when such well-known figures of the CPG as Paul Scherber, Willy Kleist, Hans Gauslanden, Walter Dittbender or some of their close relatives were arrested, many people lost faith in the correctness of the “purge” being carried out. An atmosphere of mistrust and betrayal dominated among the emigrants, and a wave of denunciations spread.

The report of the German representative at the ECCI, Dietrich, to the Central Committee of the CPG on April 29, 1938 stated: “Indeed, more efforts are needed to convince the comrades of the fairness of the measures taken by the Soviet organs. But in general, it is clear from the conversations that trust in the party, as well as in the organs of Soviet power, is declining. In his memoirs about this period, V. Leonhard wrote: “With the end of the process in the case of the “bloc of Rights and Trotskyites” - the largest and last of the three processes during the purge from 1936 to 1938. - repression, however, did not stop. (RSASPH F. 495. I 292. C 101. P. 11.)

The leadership of the regional party committees performed their duty of revealing spies very well, political emigrants were under vigilant supervision.

In the materials for information in the Central Committee of the CPG, in the German representation at the ECCI, it was noted: "It will not be in any way an exaggeration to say that every German citizen living abroad is an agent of the Gestapo."

On April 28, 1938, 842 Germans arrested by the PKIF were registered with the German representation of the ECCI, but this is only the part of those arrested who are registered with the German representation. The actual number of arrested Germans is, of course, higher. From October 1937 to the end of March 1938, there were only 470 arrested, in the month of March alone 100 people were arrested. On March 9, 1938, the last 4 male political emigrants were arrested in the House of Political Emigrants in Moscow. In the provinces, for example, in Engels, not a single German remained at large. In Leningrad at the beginning of 1937 there were 103 Germans, and in February 1938 only 12 people remained.: “These figures are also reflected in the payment of membership dues. While at the beginning of 1937 1,300 members of the CPG paid membership dues to the German representation, at present there are only 378 members who paid membership dues, of which 17 did not pay this year, and since Since we don't know anything about them, we don't know if they still exist. To this we must also add three comrades: Bertha Kelle, Schutz Eliza and Erich Wundersee did not pay membership fees since the end of 1937. The amount of membership fees fell from 10,000 rubles at the beginning of 1937 to 3,000 rubles. in April 1938 this year it was received: in January - 6.783.40 rubles; in February - 4.226.75 rubles; in March - 3.377.65 rubles. and in April - 3.916, 10 rubles. 224. It can be said that by April 1938 more than 70% of the members of the CPG were arrested by the PKIF.

In the materials for information in the Central Committee of the CPG, addressed to comrade. Dengel, it was noted: "If the arrests continue in the future in such a volume as in March 1938, then within three months not a single member of the CPG will remain."

Political émigrés turned out to be hostages of the Soviet system, Soviet politics, they were isolated, they were under vigilant control, they were "dissolved" in society. The reports noted: “They are shocked and overwhelmed by the numerous arrests. When one meets the other, he asks: “Are you still alive?” When comrades come to our bureau to pay membership dues, they say: “Well, is your file cabinet getting smaller and smaller? How much is left, one dozen?” “Are you now taking 2 times a day? We are generally surprised that you have not completely closed yet. Head. Belov, the personnel department of the ECCI, wrote in a memorandum: “Almost everywhere, foreigners and persons of foreign origin are, as a rule, removed from work. For example, according to available information, all foreign employees at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute were recently fired from their jobs. At the Institute of World Economy and World Politics, more than 20 people have recently been reduced, most of them foreigners or persons of foreign origin. They also remove foreigners from work at factories ... There are reports that people who have long accepted Soviet citizenship and transferred to the CPSUare also dismissed from work, only because they are former foreigners. Unemployed German emigrants there is one Moscow each: 20 people dismissed from the apparatus of the ECCI and unable to find work, 20 people dismissed from other international organizations, 15-20 people dismissed from factories and economic organizations. In addition, about 90 people of German political emigrants live in the house of political emigrants, who have been looking for work for a year or more and cannot find it.” (Manukyan M.N. 2014: 106-110).

Those who were declared "spies and fascists" and who nevertheless were arrested, were expected by lengthy interrogations. A questionnaire was set up for each arrested person. In addition to traditional items such as “Last name, first name, patronymic. Date of Birth. Place of Birth. Place of residence. Profession and specialty. Place of service and position or occupation. Passport, etc.” The questionnaire contained items that related to the period of life in the Soviet Union, related to anti-Soviet activities: “Service in the White and other armies, participation in gangs and uprisings under Soviet power (when and in what capacity); What kind of repressions was he subjected to under Soviet rule: a criminal record, arrest, etc. (when, by what body and for what). After filling out the questionnaire, the arrested were forgotten, they disappeared, no one knew anything about them. The only connection with the outside world was numerous interrogations by the PKIF. Hans Hauska recalled: “All conversations were conducted in Russian. My request for an interpreter was denied. The investigator brought a dictionary with him just in case. He told me that he knew German himself, but it turned out that his vocabulary was a couple of expressions, namely, "Communist Party of Germany" and even rude abuse. During interrogations, the innocent were made enemies, spies, counter-revolutionaries, "hostile class elements." About the interrogations, Hauske X. wrote the following: “Immediately after being taken to the Lubyanka, they began to send people for interrogation and, without asking too many questions, severely beat them.” For many, the time of imprisonment was short-lived. They were "spare" from lengthy interrogations, their guilt was "already proven in advance." “very day and every night a couple of people were called “with things”. Among them were many who were not interrogated at all, and only a few were “under investigation” for a couple of days. In 99% of all cases in the Taganrog prison they were “sentenced” in this way.”

The prisoners still found out who and how much they convicted, finding any ways: “Although these sentences were not announced to us in the cells - the arrested were simply taken away“ with things”-, nevertheless, thanks to the inscriptions in the bathhouse or toilet, we found out about the terms that our former cellmates received. The "norm" then was 10 years, in some cases 8 years, in "happy cases" - 5 years. Hans Hauske described what foreign citizens could expect in his Chronicles of Experience: “Some experts told me that, as a citizen of a foreign state, I can only be sent out of the USSR by the Special Conference”. Constant interrogations, uncertainty, expectation of the worst, the worst conditions of existence plunged "a person in a few days into an almost bestial state." Hauske X. recalled: “You gradually get dumber and fall into some kind of abyss. There was no clean linen. Everything was full of bugs. We were all terribly overgrown, our beards were trimmed only once a month with a typewriter. She was almost not sheared, but simply pulled out a tuft of hair.

Tests awaited those who remained at large. It was impossible to talk with the enemies of the people, wives, after the arrest of their husbands, lost their housing and jobs, and were also expelled from the party if they were members of it. Attempts to find support in the IOAFR turned out to be fruitless. They were not allowed into the building of the Comintern In the bureau of German representatives, scenes of despair of the wives of the arrested were a common occurrence. From despair, bewilderment, loneliness, many wives tried to commit suicide.

In the autumn of 1938, a particularly wide wave of arrests swept through for several weeks... The rout also affected the foreign communists living in the Soviet Union. In a few months, more leaders were arrested in the apparatus of the Comintern than were arrested in 20 years by all the bourgeois governments together. Indeed, in connection with mass layoffs, many employees of the Comintern were out of work on the eve of their arrest. V. Leonhard, being a child, was brought by his mother to the USSR after the Nazis came to power. He was brought up in an international orphanage, studied at the institute, and then at the school of the Comintern, worked in the National Committee "Free Germany". He survived the arrest of his mother, mass repressions against honest communists, deportation to Kazakhstan. 107 had no citizenship. As a result of the Stalinist terror, the CPG suffered heavy losses. Most of the emigrants are gradually becoming disillusioned, disillusioned about the justice of the party's policy. The status of a political emigrant was discredited. In his letter to the political emigrant Fr. Huber noted on April 23, 1939, that the political emigrant no longer has a positive sound. The letter makes it possible to judge the atmosphere among the political émigrés: “...Now the German émigrés are completely 'atomized'. Everyone lives for himself within his own four walls, in fear of being associated with an arrested acquaintance or somehow discrediting himself. The leadership of the regional party committees performed their duty of revealing spies very regularly, and political emigrants were under vigilant supervision. In the materials for information in the Central Committee of the CPG, in the German representation at the ECCI, it was noted: "It will not be an exaggeration in any case, if you say ... every German citizen living abroad is an agent of the Gestapo." On April 28, 1938, 842 Germans arrested by the PKIF were registered with the German representation of the ECCI, but this is only the part of those arrested who are registered with the German representation. The actual number of arrested Germans is, of course, higher. From October 1937 until the end of March 1938 there were only 470 arrested, in the month of March alone 100 people were arrested. How many people were arrested, and for what period of time the arrests occurred, could be judged by the payment of membership dues to the party: “These figures are also reflected in the payment of party membership dues. While at the beginning of 1937 1,300 members of the CPG paid membership dues to the German representation, at present there are only 378 members who paid membership dues, of which 17 did not pay this year, and since we know nothing of them, it is not known whether they still exist. The amount of membership fees fell from 10,000 rubles at the beginning of 1937 to 3,000 rubles. in April 1938.

The head of the personnel Department of IKKI Belov wrote in a memo: "Almost everywhere foreigners and persons of foreign origin, as a rule, are removed from work. So, according to reports, all foreign employees at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute have recently been dismissed from work. The Institute of World Economy and World Politics has recently reduced over 20 people, most of them foreigners or persons of foreign origin. Foreigners are also removed from work in factories. There are reports that people who have long accepted Soviet citizenship and transferred to the CPSU are also being removed from work only because they are former foreigners. The realization that everyone, without exception, could be subjected to such a punishment came very soon. Everyone was preparing for the arrests, they no longer talked about the justice of the arrests, they were just expected and feared: "In the middle of March of 1938, some comrades living in the house of Political Emigrants packed their suitcases and, full of fear and horror, expected to be arrested" On September 15, 1937, the personnel department of the Comintern proposed to its leadership: 1. ...urgently conduct a thorough check of all political emigration and make a final decision on the further use of each political emigrant. Those whom it will be decided to leave in the USSR should be offered to immediately obtain Soviet citizenship. For persons sending abroad, if they have already accepted Soviet citizenship, an application for renunciation of Soviet citizenship must be initiated immediately; 2. To apply to the CPSU with a request: a) to establish a list of localities in which it is allowed to reside, and a list of enterprises or industries in which emigrants who do not enjoy political trust are allowed to work; b) to establish a certain procedure for sending foreigners and persons who do not enjoy political trust to work, with an obligation to accept them c) give instructions to the PKIF bodies that all foreigners left in the USSR should receive appropriate documents indicating where they have the right to reside; d) to give special instructions to the relevant authorities about the place of residence and the procedure for sending family members of persons arrested by the PKIF to work. "According to Soviet laws, an arrest warrant with justification of its reason had to be presented to the arrested person^ within two weeks. Most of us have not seen this warrant at all or received it only a few months later". The prisoners still found out about who was convicted and how much, looking for any means: "Although these sentences were not announced to us in the cells - the arrested were simply taken away "with things" -, nevertheless, thanks to the inscriptions in the bath or toilet, we learned about the terms that our former cellmates received. The "norm" then was 10 years, in some cases 8 years, in "lucky cases" - 5 years. Hans Hauske described what foreign citizens could expect in his "Chronicles of the Experience": "Some experts told me that as a citizen of a foreign state, I could only be expelled from the USSR by a Special meeting. Constant interrogations, uncertainty, expectation of the worst, the worst conditions of existence plunged a person into an almost bestial state in a few days. He asked for how long my passport was valid. Then he demanded my consent to work abroad as a secret agent of the PKIF."In case of refusal, blackmail by relatives followed, the same happened with Hauske X.: "You must not forget," he replied, "that your wife is a Soviet citizen and that the PKIF knows everything about her connection with her family in Germany, and that she will be arrested for it". After a short pause, he showed me the arrest warrant for my wife. Then I was seized with fear, I asked what they wanted from her. He replied: this, they say, is the PKIF's business."After being reminded of relatives and their possible future fate, the outcome was unequivocal. Hans Hauske wrote: Russian Russian and I wrote the following statements: "I hereby undertake to work abroad as a secret agent of the PKIF of the USSR and never tell anyone about this commitment." Signed in Russian and German. I chose the name "Walter Frank" as a pseudonym, indicated the conditional address: Moscow, 20, on demand. After that, I was taken back to the cell". Trials awaited those who remained at large. It was impossible to talk to the enemies of the people, wives were deprived of housing and work after the arrest of their husbands, and were also excluded from the party if they were in it. In the backyard of the “Lux Hotel”, a ruined house was equipped, in which the relatives of the arrested were settled. Attempts to find support in the PRI were unsuccessful. They were not allowed into the Comintern building. A special bureau was created to work with the relatives of the arrested. The work of the bureau was aimed at helping in job search, providing various kinds of references. "In the bureau of German representatives, scenes of despair of the wives of the arrested were commonplace. Out of despair, bewilderment, loneliness, many wives tried to commit suicide. The reports noted: "It really takes more effort to convince comrades of the justice of the actions of the Soviet authorities. But in general, it is clear from the conversations that confidence in the party, as well as in the organs of Soviet power, is falling." At the turn of 1938-1939, the bloody purge stopped as suddenly as it had begun. In his memoirs V. Leonhard wrote: "Today it seems amazing to me how quickly people in Moscow, including me, could erase thoughts of this horror from their memory. We have really been through too much during these terrible months. Our senses are probably dulled. A few weeks later, after Yezhov's removal, arrests were talked about only in rare cases. (Manukyan M.N. 2014: 106-110).

The persecution of Germans as a mass phenomenon was officially announced for the first time by the TASS news agency. In his message dated March 1, 1937, it was said that back in November 1936, citizens of this country were arrested in Moscow and Leningrad for counterrevolutionary activities and espionage. The German Embassy and the Ambassador himself, Count von Schulenburg, made attempts to secure the release of the arrested. Despite the lack of comprehensive information, they kept records of cases of detention and arrest of German citizens. Thus, the embassy list No. 1 included 67 people arrested since October 13, 1936. until May 12, 1937 These people lived mainly in Ukraine, Central Russia, the Urals and Siberia, and all were charged with political charges.

Despite all the efforts of the embassy staff, the German side could not achieve accurate data. By 1935, at least 6 thousand citizens of the Third Reich lived in the USSR. As a result of Hitler's coming to power in Germany and the beginning of large-scale repressions within the Soviet Union, the vast majority of Germans hastily left the USSR. As a result, by the beginning of the "Great Terror", no more than 1 thousand German citizens remained in the Soviet Union. By July 1937, 130 of them had been arrested. The situation of the families of those arrested also turned out to be tragic.

According to the German Embassy, 360 Germans were already in custody by September 1937, and in 1937 diplomats established 730 cases of arrests and detentions of German citizens, of which about 70% were specialists and skilled workers who had previously concluded contracts with Soviet enterprises.

The embassy claimed that the actual number of foreign citizens arrested was 40-50% higher than the official figures given. According to the embassy, the arrests continued until mid-1939. In 1938, 445 German citizens were detained, in 1939 – 235 people. The German government carried out an action to remove its citizens from the territory of the USSR. Several transports were organized, with which Germans were sent home from different places of the Soviet Union. So, in a report from Warsaw, from where the movement of migrants was monitored, it was said that they were sent from Kiev, Odessa and Kharkov through the territory of Poland.

Many German citizens quite justifiably assumed that upon their return to their homeland they were unlikely to be welcomed with open arms and agreed to cooperate with the investigative authorities. One of the forms of cooperation was to make a public political statement condemning fascism. The form of such a statement, which fell into the hands of German diplomats, intensified the work of the embassy to collect information about the activities and political preferences of all German citizens living in the territory of the Soviet Union. Whether such work was crowned with success or not is difficult to judge. It is only known for certain that, as a result of changes in the political situation in Western Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1930s, not all foreign citizens were able to finish their work under an employment contract on time and, regardless of external factors, decide on their future place of residence. For many, the opportunity to return to their homeland has become illusory.

Currently, thanks to declassified archival documents, we have become aware of the fate of many repressed foreigners working in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s.

It must be recognized that the recorded testimony does not represent objective evidence of the events that occurred. After all, if we assume that the agents of the intelligence agencies of the Third Reich admitted from the first time that they systematically transmit data to the General Staff, Germany would hardly have been able to capture half of the European continent with such people. The objectivity lies only in the fact that these people tragically ended their lives, in the fact that they fell into the flywheel of the foreign policy processes of the pre-war years.

Since the middle of 1939, the wave of arrests began to decline, some Germans were able to return to their homeland at this time. So, on December 8, 1939, the government of the USSR gave consent for 92 women to leave for Germany. Those leaving at the same time were deprived of Soviet citizenship (if they had it at that time). In part, the change in the situation was due to the 153 events of 1939, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression treaty was signed between the USSR and Germany on August 23, and in September of the same year the German-Soviet treaty of friendship and borders came into effect.

National operations were conducted throughout the country. Foreigners who had taken Soviet citizenship, their family members, and Soviet citizens who had close contacts with those under investigation also came under investigation. Foreign citizens were charged with a variety of charges, not limited to suspicions of espionage.

If we talk about the procedure for convicting foreign nationals, it should be noted that it differed from the generally accepted one. It consisted of several stages of the work of the central and local PKIF bodies. During the investigation, the departments drew up conclusions with recommendations as punishment, including execution and imprisonment in the camp. Then they were included in a special list ("album"), signed by the head of the PKIF Department, the prosecutor and sent for consideration to the Central Office in Moscow. The final decision on each individual case was made by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs N.I. Yezhov and the prosecutor of the USSR A. Vyshinsky. The sentences were executed upon the return of the "albums" to the local PKIF (Lubyanka. Stalin and the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD. 1937-1938.).

Thus, it is established that the authorities considered their active involvement in socio-political activities to be one of the ways to quickly integrate foreign workers into Soviet society. This approach was understood by both communist activists and apolitical foreign workers, many of whom saw social work primarily as a way of self-realization and career growth. Various forms of social activity aroused the interest of foreigners. Party and public organizations intensified the participation of foreign workers in the movement of inventors and innovators, foreign workers were involved in socio-political work. Most of the immigrants who were members of various Marxist organizations, communist and social democratic parties back in their homeland joined the ranks of the CPSU and even took Soviet citizenship.

Thus, based on the conducted research, it can be concluded that in the USSR in the 1930s a certain group of foreigners, the so-called "Soviet foreigners" – foreign citizens who arrived in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s-1930s. as political or economic immigrants, for whom the impossibility or unwillingness to return to their homeland due to various objective and subjective circumstances caused their "dissolution" in Soviet society: someone took Soviet citizenship and remained in the USSR consciously, and someone was arrested and sentenced to prison during the period of mass repression or the highest penalty is execution. (Pavlova V.V. 2016:154).

The dynamics of the contingent itself is interesting. Compared with the pre-war situation, by the end of the war there was a significant increase in the number of foreigners sent to the zone, by 1950 their number in the zone reached almost 30 thousand people, but it was during 1950, when, probably, 5-year sentences began to expire, their number almost halved.

In the data for 1939, a very small number of Germans and a complete absence of Poles are noteworthy: they were most likely held in prisons. Among the campers, citizens of China stand out (most likely they are Russians from Harbin) and Iran, whose share will fall significantly by 1945, but later, by 1951, it will increase again. At that time, the vast majority went to the citizens of the countries with which the USSR was at war - Germany, which accounted for more than half of all foreigners in the zone, as well as Romania and Hungary (this cannot be said about Italy). In 1950, Japan was added to them, but the shares of these countries themselves noticeably shrank (moreover, Hungary, becoming the second country after Germany in terms of the number of its citizens in the GULAG, far surpassed Romania); the second noticeable trend was the appearance and gradual increase in the share of Polish citizens.

In February 1953 (that is, literally on the eve of Stalin's death) The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB have prepared a resolution "On the organization of special camps for the detention of Germans, Austrians and other foreigners convicted by military tribunals of groups of Soviet occupation forces in Germany and Austria." It was assumed that the Ministry of Internal Affairs would prepare four camp departments for these purposes-two in the Mordovian ASSR, one in the Irkutsk region and one in Kazakhstan, completing the work on their transfer within a 6-month period. The MGB was obliged to continue to take convicted Germans from the GDR to the territory of the USSR only in particularly severe cases (espionage, terror, sabotage, and some others), placing them only in special camp departments. A year before the expiration of the sentence, convicts from the USSR were transported to the prisons of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the GDR or in the Soviet occupation zone of Austria. (Polyan P.M., Glezer O.B. 2004).

Information about the authors:

Zakarya Rakhmetolla–PhD student. Junior researcher, Ch.Ch. Valikhanov Institute of History and Ethnology, Email: krzakarya@gmail.com.

REFERENCES:

Art. 58 paragraphs 1, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR as amended in 1926.

BÝGAI Nıkolaı Fedorovıch SOVETSKIE ITALЬIaNTsY: TRANSFORMATsII ETNIChESKOI OBNOSTI. 1930-e – 2010-e GODY Istorıcheskaıa ı sotsıalno-obrazovatelnaıa mysl. Tom 6 №6, Chast 1, 2014 Str 41-49.

Lýbıanka. Stalın ı Glavnoe ýpravlenıe gosýdarstvennoı bezopasnostı NKVD. 1937-1938. https://istmat.org/node/29597.

Manýkıan Marıeta Nodarovna Germanskaıa polıtıcheskaıa emıgratsııa v SSSR (1933-1941 gg.) Voronejskıı gosýdarstvennyı pedagogıcheskıı ýnıversıtet. Dıssertatsııa na soıskanıe ýchenoı stepenı kandıdata ıstorıcheskıh naýk 2014 Str 63.

Pavlova Vera Vladımırovna MEJDÝNARODNAIa TRÝDOVAIa IMMIGRATsIIa V SSSR V 1920–1930-E GG. (NA MATERIALAH RSFSR I ÝKRAINSKOI SSR) DISSERTATsIIa na soıskanıe ýchenoı stepenı kandıdata ıstorıcheskıh naýk Moskva – 2016 Federalnoe gosýdarstvennoe bıýdjetnoe obrazovatelnoe ýchrejdenıe vysshego obrazovanııa «Moskovskıı pedagogıcheskıı gosýdarstvennyı ýnıversıtet» Str 134-135.

P.M. Polıan, O.B. Glezer. M.: OGI, 2004 Inostrantsy v GÝLAGE: sovetskıe repressıı protıv ınostrannopoddannyh 2004 Demoskop Weekly http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2004/0147/analit03.php.

Postanovlenıe Polıtbıýro Tsentralnogo komıteta Vsesoıýznoı kommýnıstıcheskoı partıı bolshevıkov "O kadrah oboronnoı promyshlennostı". Protokol № 59 ot 23 marta 1938 goda.

Rezanenko Olga Olegovna INOSTRANNYE SPETsIALISTY NA PROMYShLENNYH PREDPRIIaTIIaH STALINGRADA V KONTsE 1920-h–1930-e gg. Federalnoe gosýdarstvennoe avtonomnoe obrazovatelnoe ýchrejdenıe vysshego obrazovanııa «Volgogradskıı gosýdarstvennyı ýnıversıtet» DISSERTATsIIa na soıskanıe ýchёnoı stepenı kandıdata ıstorıcheskıh naýk Volgograd – 2018 Str 101-114.

RSASPH F. 495. I 292. C 101. P. 10.

RSASPH F. 495. I 292. C 101. P. 11.

Sobranıe zakonov SSSR ot 1931 g. № 69, st. 459. O rabote zernovyh sovhozov.

Vernı mne moıý svobodý! Deıatelı lıteratýry ı ıskýsstva Rossıı ı Germanıı - jertvy stalınskogo terrora. Memorıalnyı sbornık dokýmentov ız arhıvov byvshego KGB. /f.f. Kolıazın M., 1997.-S. 24.

ҒТАМР 03.09.55

ЕУРОПАЛЫҚЭМИГРАНТТАРҒАҚАТЫСТЫКЕҢЕСҮКІМЕТІНІҢРЕПРЕССИЯЛЫҚСАЯСАТЫ

Р. Закарья

Ш.Ш. Уалиханов атындағы Тарих және этнология институты, Қазақстан, Алматы.

^*Автор-корреспондент

E-mail: krzakarya@gmail.com (Закарья Рахметолла)

Аннотация. 1930 жылдардан бастап сыртқы саяси жағдайларға байланысты партияның шетелдік эмигранттарға қатынасы өзгерді. Антисоветтік пропоганданы немесе диверсияны халықтар арасында тарату мүмкіндігі эмигранттар арасында "тазартуды" қажет етті. "Үлкен Террор" басталғанға дейін шетелдіктерді тұтқындау тәртібі кеңес азаматтарын тұтқындау тәртібінен біршама өзгеше болды: әрбір осындай қамауға алу немесе тінту үшін ішкі істер халық комиссарының немесе оның орынбасарының санкциясы талап етілді. Олар істің соттылығын анықтап, оларды сотқа, трибуналға немесе әскери алқаға жіберді. Егер әлеуметтік қорғау шарасы ретінде арнайы жиналыстың шешімі бойынша шетелге шығару керек болса, онда қамауға алынбай-ақ жасаған жөн.

"Үлкен террор" бұл ережелерден Аз қалды: тұтқындау мен тінту кезінде Мәскеумен келісу енді қажет болмады. Саяси эмигранттар кеңестік жүйенің, кеңестік саясаттың барымтасы болды, олар оқшауланды, олар мұқият бақылауда болды, қоғамда "ерітілді".

Түйін сөздер: КСРО, репрессия, шетелдіктер, саясат, анти-империализм.

МРНТИ 03.09.55

РЕПРЕССИВНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА СОВЕТСКОЙ ВЛАСТИ ПО ОТНОШЕНИЮ К ЕВРОПЕЙСКИМ ЭМИГРАНТАМ

Р. Закарья

Институт истории и этнологии им.Ч.Ч. Валиханова, Казахстан, Алматы.

^*Корреспондирующий автор

E-mail: krzakarya@gmail.com(Закарья Рахметолла)

Аннотация. С 1930 годов в связи с внешне-политическими обстоятельствами изменились отношение партии к иностранным эмигрантам. Возможность распространение среди народов антисоветскую пропоганду или же проведение диверсии вызвало необходимость прведение «чистки» среди эмигрантов. До начала «Большого террора» порядок арестов иностранцев несколько отличался от порядка ареста советских граждан: на каждый такой арест или обыск требовалась санкция наркома внутренних дел или его заместителя. Они же определяли подсудность дела и направляли их или в суд, или в трибунал, или в Военную коллегию. Если в качестве меры социальной защиты предполагалась высылка за границу по решению Особого совещания, то предпочтительнее было обходиться и вовсе без ареста.

«Большой террор» мало что оставил от этих правил: согласование с Москвой при арестах и обысках более не требовалось. Политэмигранты оказались заложниками советской системы, советской политики, их изолировали, они были под бдительным контролем, их «растворили» в обществе.

Ключевые слова:  СССР, репрессия, иностранцы, политика, антиимпериализм.