With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Iranian leaders repeatedly proclaimed that their country has the potential to spread to Central Asia as a proponent of Islamic values. In addition, Iran is trying to introduce itself as the leader of the Islamic world.
But in the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of independent states in the post-Soviet lands, the Islamic revolution was taking place in Iran, and the implicit concept of the issuance of the revolution was destroyed. It is difficult to imagine that in those years, among the political and political leaders of Central Asian countries, he found the notion of the word of one of the Iranian thinkers, Jalaluddin Farsi: "We established the Islamic revolution in Iran and turned it into a revolution Islamic world knows our duty ... After the Islamic Revolution in Afghanistan, the real Islamic world will begin ... We will raise the Third Islamic Revolution in Central Asia. " [1].
The statement by former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati was also silent. He pointed out that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of communist ideology had created a kind of ideological vacuum, and Iran should fill this vacuum with its ideology. It is clear that in Central Asian countries nobody wants to enter such a Islamic stateWith the understanding of these conditions and with the prediction of the potential reaction of the radical Soviet ideology of the secular and secular leaders of Central Asian countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a more targeted and purposeful purpose than its predecessors, hastened the active use of the policy and ideology of the Islamic Revolution in relations and There are no relations with the countries of this region. For this reason, despite the fact that the idea of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 in its external appearance was to issue Islamic ideology in its holy form.
Iran's religious leaders gradually refrained from theorizing and pragmatism into extremism and joined the advocates of a balanced Islamic form. At the moment, the invitation to issue the Islamic Revolution is not a primary means of establishing partnership and cooperation with Central Asian governments. Officials of Iran have officially announced a policy of distance from spreading the ideas of the Islamic Revolution in the region. Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's envoy to the United Nations, who had worked hard to strengthen the talks between Iran and Central Asia between 2005 and 1997, stated that Iran was to establish good neighborly relations with Central Asian independent states Hopes for any political and ideological pressures [1].
Iran-Russia co-operation in the context of the civil war in Tajikistan and the steps taken to resolve and discipline political issues only on the basis of a clear plan between them in order to refuse to issue the Islamic Revolution to the Asian region Central became possible. The common position on the issues and problems of combating religious extremism unites the governments of Central Asia, Iran and Russia. It should be noted that the threats and dangers of religious extremism allegedly stem from the Taliban's extreme Taliban movement in Afghanistan. In addition to these factors, it should be noted that, based on the militancy that has taken place in the Central Asian region, Religious and non-religious leadership is also clearly criticized. Religious extremism can not be viewed as a democratic opposition. As the incidents of the Tajik civil war period, the events of Andijan in 2005 and the color revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the extremist actions of extremist religious movements were considered to be totalitarianism, in which the dishonesty of the democracy of non-religious states and of many states National and multinational. In this regard, it must be said that it is a threat to terrorism based on distorted interpretations of religious norms and also in the struggle for warfare by extremist religious groups-trained and equipped with modern equipment for the mandatory replacement of democratic institutions by institutions Religious and religious beliefs. The positions of Iran and the governments of Central Asia about the events in Syria are also close and close, where Syrian friends seem to be demanding the introduction of democracy in this country. As it is clear, real and real help to pseudo-gangs An opposition military is provided by extremist terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and others that have led to disagreements and extremist religious regimes instead of non-religious ones in countries such as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt [3].
Now, in Syria, these "friends" do not conceal their goal of forming a caliphate. Iran, along with Russia, China and Central Asian states, condemned the invasion of terrorists and extremists and at any price received from the legitimate government of Bashar al-Assad Unfortunately, sometimes the texts of the Helsinki Documents, the Paris Charter, the Copenhagen Declaration of 1990 and the European Security Charter, which relate to the pursuit of religious and ideological reasons, are interpreted by international organizations in the light of the legal considerations of ethnic minorities. Along with these factors, extremism does not always belong to racial or religious minorities. When talking about Central Asia, for example, there is an incorrect interpretation and understanding of the truth that, as a result, measures are taken to revive the rights of ethnic minorities and to defend the leaders of extremist religious groups that use The forms and methods of terrorist attempt to achieve their ambitious political goals [4].
There is no doubt that the revival of religious space in the countries of Central Asia is satisfactory for Iran, albeit with the understanding that this is happening in the minds of the inevitable reforms. This is even evident in the less Islamicized region of the Kyrgyzstan region, where during the years of post-Soviet development the process of intensive formation of the Islamic religious space began. For example, the growth of the number of mosques during the years 2005 - 1991 from 39 to 1613 is quite tangible. Even if there were not even an Islamic educational institution in 1991, there are currently 6 Islamic universities and 43 schools. Young people who complete religious education even have increased abroad. Many graduates of religious educational institutions after returning to the country have been thinking about it and are trying to convey ideas and ideas of political Islam and extremist beliefs to their fellow citizens. As the number of religious institutions and the revival of religious education in the country increase, religious propaganda also expands.
Since Kyrgyzstan has a moderate Islamist tradition, the majority of those who are mainly teaching religious religious schools are from the Sunni region of Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other countries. To be At the same time, in Kyrgyzstan, the non-public representatives of some foreign religious-political organizations such as Populus al-Islam (Pakistan), "Islam the Taliban crowd" from Afghanistan, etc. were also active in carrying out hostile propaganda against the current This caused instability in the country. Recently, the Hizb ut-Tahrir-al-Islam party has expanded in Kyrgyzstan. The party is declared illegal in Kyrgyzstan. Hizb ut-Tahrir-al-Islam's activities have focused on the corpses that are trying to revive ideas and thoughts on the formation of the Islamic caliph, especially in the south, where the majority of the faithful are Uzbeks. Now in Kyrgyzstan, there are several religious organizations supported by extremist organizations. The type of activities of the Muslim clerics and the recruiting of some extremist Islamic organizations has led Kyrgyzstan's government structures to try and control Islamic clergy. This control and monitoring included the transparency of the activities of clerics, such as their lectures in mosques, teaching in religious educational institutions, familiarization with their religious books and propaganda, and controlling the relations of clerics with activists of Islamic organizations, which was recently considered illegal. Their relationship to participatory trade with the presence of employers from the Arab and Iranian countries is also monitored and their travels abroad, including Iran, which in recent years has become one of the most visited countries for residents of the Central Asian region, especially for clerics Islamic transformation is controlled. It is not a coincidence that the Kyrgyz model of attracting Islamic clerics to intellectual currents could be sought in Central Asian countries, especially in countries that are far superior to Kyrgyzstan in terms of Islamism. It is clear that these conditions are positively evaluated in Iran, a country that is precisely following the religious conditions in the region and is trying to influence peacefully in these cultures [5].
For Iran, a combination of non-religious and religious rule, as it has happened in Tajikistan, is more acceptable. In this country, 99 percent of its adult population are considered Muslim, and one third of them regularly provide the essential Islamic traditions. In the post-Soviet period in Tajikistan, religious organizations were formed with political orientations. In this country, the Islamic party of the resurrection is in legal condition. The Islamic Party of the Resurrection was the only Islamic Party in the Central Asian region, which had a large participation in the country's presidential election, and this showed its high electoral potential. Unfortunately, after this incident, Tajikistan's Islamic countries entered into a heated conflict with the heads of state that the conflict left them out of the country's political atmosphere for seven years. The Tajik conflict was a long and tumultuous one, but in the summer of 1997, when Iran returned to legal political activity and signed a peace agreement and a national agreement with the country's government, it became normal. It is noteworthy that the guarantee and guarantee of this agreement were between Russia and Iran.
Iran's role in this process can be positively evaluated, since its observers have steadily monitored the implementation of the agreements and, by following this point, did not allow the non-religious government to press on the Islamic Republic anew, because This would have led Tajiks to extremism and lead to their proximity to the terrorist groups in Central Asia, which is by no means consistent with the tactic of Iran's cooperation with Tajikistan, and this could be a busy dialogue. Iranian - Tajik [6].
Now the Islamic Resurrection Party in Tajikistan has low but certain levers in the government. To One of the presidents of this party is the vice presidential post. There are also several key ministries under their control. In addition, the memorandum reached in Tajikistan between religious and non-religious leaders is also shaky. Analysts are talking about a clear contradiction that will eventually collapse in the future of Tajik talks. In the composition of the Islamic Resurrection Party, there are forces insisting on the formation of the Islamic State in Tajikistan. But public opinion polls show that this is contradictory to the opinion of the majority of local residents, and is consequently not optimistic and ineffective. But the situation in Kazakhstan looks different. For the Shiite Iran, it is very difficult to establish religious relations with followers of the Sunni religion of the Hanafi branch of Kazakhstan, because the Cossacks who accepted Islam for centuries adhere to the Qur'anic religious beliefs to some extent with loyalty to the traditional pre-Islamic customs and practices They were mixed up with their ancestors - immigrant Turks - inherited from them. Hajj Ahmad Yasawi (1163-1116), an Sufi thinker living in the current territory of South Kazakhstan, established the coordination of Islamic centers and linguistic traditions in the context of the nomadic tribes. But in Iran, the variant of the local Islam was weakened by the weakness of Kazakhstan's local Islam as a platform for introducing the inner tendencies toward the weak roots of Islamic traditions in the life of the religious leaders of the country. Aside from that, Islam as one of the consequences of the high level of modernization and the policy of inhumanity that was implemented during the Soviet era had long been the subject of social life [6].
That's why in Kazakhstan, unlike other Central Asian countries, such as Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, the process of revival of Islam is much weaker. Islam, as a religion, does not have a significant impact on the accepted political and social trends in the country. Recognizing that Kazakhstan is an inseparable part of the large area of Islamic culture and the Kazakhs have long-standing beliefs about this religion, however, there are some points in this country that the efforts made The ideology of extremist Islam does not have public support for Kazakhstan.
Today there are no political-social parties and Islamic schools in Kazakhstan. In this country, they are deeply concerned that in the event of Islamic extremism, the systematic and integrated racial orientation in the society will be broken apart and the isolation of religious leaders will become more severe. Considering that the Kazakhs are only slightly more than half the inhabitants of the country, in total, only a minority of ethnic minorities remain silent against the Cossacks, and it is impossible to conceive the possibility and probability of conflicts of opinion and competition. This will be possible if the ideas of the issuance of the Islamic Revolution are in any way motivated to revitalize Islam. At the moment, such an outlook is not realistic. But the southern part of the country should not be considered remote from the point of view of the small, but the maximum Muslim area, where the percentage of population and Uzbek residents is high. In recent years, there has been a surge in Islamic extremist propaganda that has led to propaganda by missionaries from Arab countries, Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan. There are also a number of religious education institutions with a religious orientation, such as the University of Kazakhstan-Kuwait, Al-Kuwait Orientalism Center, the Kazakh-Arabic International University (all in Chimkent), the Kazakh Institute for Islamology, the Islamic University (both In Almaty) that have been created in recent decades.
Moreover, in Kazakhstan, like other post-Soviet governments, the same factor in the expansion and expansion of relations has linked the danger of the emergence of the impact of Islamic thought that has certain threats to instability. In Kazakhstan, this realistically realizes that excessive proximity to Iran could lead to the undesirable reaction of the West and, first of all, the United States of America, which has an unfavorable relationship with Iran, which seeks this country as a terrorist state. . This is precisely what makes the Kazakh government compels the regularity and level of cooperation with Iran while trying to use positive opportunities for cooperation [7].
Relying on Islam as a coordinating agent in implementing Turkmenistan-Iran cooperation also became groundless. Here, as in Kazakhstan during the Soviet rule, the Turkmen state leaders who believed in Sunni Islam endured secularism. The revival of political space did not allow the beginning of a revival of Islam, although in Turkmenistan it was more evident than the rise of the mosque, the introduction of Islamic foundations into school curricula, the comprehensive study of the Qur'an, and the expansion of the system of religious education. In the Soviet era, there were only four mosques in the republic, none of them in Ashgabat. After independence, construction of Islamic religious buildings flourished, encouraged and encouraged by the government, and one of the foundations of the stability of the state saw the legitimacy and satisfaction of the society in religion. Currently, there are about 500 mosques in Turkmenistan.
In the mid-1990s, in Ashgabat, the Shiite mosque was also opened, built by Iranians. The number of Iranians who had come to Ashgabat for a short time or a long time was not so high. But the growing number of mosques did not equal the growth and growth of its visitors. A small number of believers came to the mosque for daily ceremonies and prayers, even on Friday.
Niyazov, the first Turkmen president, was unable to eliminate ideological threats for his country. He repeatedly stated that he did not see a room for reviving the ideas of extreme Islam. Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s, the Nazi policies have been subject to a severe constraint, and a state-run and comprehensive management of religious space, which has provoked the concern of Iranian religious activists. For Iranian religious leaders, the fact that the president introduced his needy as a prophet of God was like a ghost and religious deviation. In the largest mosque in the country in the village of Niyazov in the village of Cape Chak in the suburbs of Ashgabat, the walls instead of surahs of the Quran, are quoted from the works of Turkman Bashi " The incident letter is emblazoned. This was because the true Muslims were reluctant to go to it. The dissatisfaction of Iranian leaders leads to a general government control over the religious community of Turkmenistan. In this way, the Supreme Mugh to the current situation is simultaneously the successor to the President of the Council (Council) in the President's religious affairs, and thus automatically becomes a high-ranking member of the government [8].
One of the previous muftis, Nasrallah ibn'Abad Allah, refused to accept Niyaz as the messenger of God, which was consequently deprived of his post and title, and was punished. Such a fate was also found in the translator of the Qur'an in Turkmen language; Haj Ahmad Akhouna, along with his family from Ashgabat, was sent to a local area. According to Niyazov, all translations of the Qur'an were collected and burned by him. This has provoked the anger of Muslims inside and outside the borders, including Iran. However, the religious system of Iran, however, did not intervene in the Islamic religious space in Turkmenistan, although the press of the Islamic Republic of Iran repeatedly wrote a lot about the suppression of Muslim clerics in the country [9].
The religious revival processes were almost active as a consequence of the liberalization of the social space in the post-Soviet period in Uzbekistan. In the early 1990s, President Karimov used this factor to secure victory at the first presidential election in December 1991 and for a massive populist endeavor. But then, from the very beginning of the special Islamic flourishing, governments felt the danger of the rise of Islamic ideology in their country, and in this regard they directly linked it with Iran's influence. But the threats that Uzbeks expressed as related to Islam were evident, not for foreign reasons, but for internal reasons. As analysts believe, these reasons must be attributed not to extreme Islam, but to their incitement and excitement from within, as a product of intrinsic contradictions in politics and socioeconomic policies, which, with their consequences, had a profound decay of the lives of the inhabitants. explained. In this context, the ideas of social justice and equality raised by Islamic thinkers with the support of residents were encountered. It is no coincidence that the apparent growth of Islamic thought in the province of Forkhan, the hills of Uzbekistan, where socioeconomic problems led to the poverty of the majority of the inhabitants. The government reacted to this by taking firm action on taking over and overcoming the rise of Islamic thought and not seeking its causes. The suppression of the measures taken by Islamic activists, high-ranking religious workers and low-level religious leaders by Uzbek leaders led to the formation and establishment of Islamic organizations in the mid-1990s that were active in political slogans. With the absence of real political opposition in Uzbekistan, the Islamists tried to fill the gap.
While Uzbekistan is focusing on repression of Muslims, it also prevents Islam from being pronounced. (Argumnishi, 1988, 114-113). All of this, together with the incidents on the Uzbek border, for Tajikistan, where Islamic elements are one of the main Factors that led the country to a bloody civil war were the motives behind the Uzbek leadership towards concluding a policy of encouraging Islam. In May 1998, a new draft law on freedom of expression and religious institutions was passed that was deterrent and made legislation more rigid in religious matters.
The terms described in many cases affect the development of relations between Iran and the Republic of Uzbekistan. Particularly, Uzbekistan's internal policy of religious relations negatively affects Uzbekistan-Iran relations. The Iranian press strongly reacts to the suppression of Islamic religious activists in Uzbekistan in recent years. In September 2001, the official IRNA news agency released a news release that recorded 800 Muslim-religious harassment in 2002-2001 according to Human Rights. [10].
Islam came to Central Asia after entering Iran. It did not take long before all the regions of Khorasan and the vast territory of Transoxiana became Muslims, and in 680 AD they accepted the tribes and nomads of Central Asia and spread to the Transcaucasian region of the Dagestan tribes within a century of Islam. Islamic culture culminated in the major cities of Central Asia, such as Samarkand, Tashkent, Bukhara and Khwarizm, and entered the new era. The cultural, social and political conditions of this land under the influence of Islam took on a new situation. Islam in the metropolitan area created such a unity among the nations that was not seen during the time of the Achaemenid rule and Alexander Macedonian domination. Bukhara of Samanids and the Seljuq empire to one of the major centers of culture of the c Hani became his age, and the garrison of the sea (Seihun) was considered to be the midst of civilization and savagery. From this time on, Islam became the dominant center of Central Asia, and since then the comprehensive school of Islam has played a significant role in the history of the region and has brought about fundamental changes in the life of the communities of the region. After converting Islam into a land with Islamic beliefs and close cultural and political ties with Iran. Islam gave the people of this region a new identity [11]. Islamic civilization has promissed radical changes in the roots of social life and the relationships between these communities and societies. Islam led the region to become the center of brilliance of great scholars and scholars, and to focus on other distant regions. Islam and its teachings were so tied to the individual and social life of the region that the occupation of the region by the tsars and the challenges that they created for the people of this land did not make significant changes. During the Soviet period, during the seven decades of suppression of the struggle To replace Islam with a kind of "scientific atheism". The long, but failed, efforts of Soviet leaders to separate the people of Central Asia from their Islamic identity, soon revealed that Islam remains an important part of the region's identity.
After independence, the surviving leaders of the communist era, who were in the wake of the changes they were trying to maintain power in the name of the leaders of national governments, found Salafism their most competing rival. The truth is that the extreme Salafism approach in recent years is the result of the opposition of the Muslim nations of Central Asia to the Soviet imposed and universal identity, and because they have not been able to deliver their strength in years, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the vacuum of power and ideology created in The region is one of the main actions of Muslims to revive and consolidate their identity by resorting to the same Salafism.
What highlights the extreme Salafism of this region is its identity as an element of their activities. In other words, Muslims in the area who have been forgotten in some way from the mind of the Muslim world after seventy years of Soviet domination attempt to identify themselves with It should be remembered that Iran's influence on the political conditions of the regional governments does not occur secretly and in isolation. Here are the contradictions between Iran and its traditional religious followers: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, as well as Turkey. In this regard, the idea that the competition between Iran and Turkey is supported and encouraged by the West, and in particular the United States, is very much considered, and it is not hidden from the point of view of the central and central governments. Iran is still from the expansion of the idea Pan-Turkism in the region is fearful. It is clear that Turkey can be the main proponent of these ideas. Moreover, the fears of this country are also confirmed by Sunnis thinking in Central Asia and its support by Islamic movements in Saudi Arabia [12].
Therefore, for these reasons, Iran does not form a long-standing relationship with the countries of the region, which makes it unpredictable. Although it tries to maintain the security of Central Asia, Iran does not penetrate Sunni extremist groups, which are usually supported by Saudi Arabia and some other countries, but does not undermine the security of the region. But the main task of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the current withdrawal stage Of political and economic isolation so that it can maintain its economic-political relations in the countries of the region. It also develops its cultural influence far beyond any political radicalism. Eventually, Iran will try to maintain geopolitical balance in Central Asia while maintaining its honest and honest relations.
The cultural and historical sharing of Iran with the countries of the Central Asian region dates back to a time when the countries of that region shared a common destiny with Iran. In the past, the geographic territory has caused these countries to adapt to the Iranian culture and traditions, so that today many customs and traditions, some of which have been forgotten even in Iran, which created those traditions. But it has remained in Central Asia. The basis of this work is based on positions that are strong enough or firmly established in the Islamic Republic of all Central Asian countries. There is no doubt about the necessity of religion for the people of Central Asia, because this religion is part of the history and culture of their millennia and ancestors and is an integral part of their social life.
Literature:
1. . 1نگاهی به آسیا و شناخت آسیای مرکزی، دکتر ناصر تکمیل همایون، مجله مطالعات آسیای مرکزی و قفقاز، زمستان 13714- Serdnia Asia سردنیا آسیا)
2. تحولات آسیای مرکزی، خانم دکتر دره میر حیدر، رشد آموزش جغرافیا، شماره مسلسل 35.
مناسبات ایران و ترکان در اواخر دوره ی ساسانی، نوشته ی A.Vongabain مندرج در کتاب تاریخ ایران، جلد سوم، قسمت اول، پژوهش دانشگاه کمبریچ، گردآورنده. جی آ. بویل. ترجمه حسن انوشه، صفحه 729 تا 739.
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- Human Rights Watch (2004), Creating Enemies of the state: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan, New York:Human Right Watch.
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Абдаллах ал-Нуимат
Әл-Фараби атындағы ҚазҰУ-дың Phd докторанты
ИСЛАМ, ИРАН ЖӘНЕ ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯ КЕҢЕС ОДАҒЫ ҚҰЛАҒАН СОҢ
ТҮЙІН СӨЗ
Мақалада автор қазіргі Орталық Азия елдеріндегі діни ахуалға сипаттама беріп, Иран сияқты ислам мемлекетінің осы аймақтағы діни ахуалға қаншалықты ықпал етіп отырғандығын зерделейді.
Түйін сөздер: Ислам, дін, Иран, діни ықпал, рухани байланыстар, дін тарихы.
Абдаллах ал-Нуимат
Phd докторант КазНУ имени ал-Фараби
ИСЛАМ, ИРАН И ЦЕНТРАЛЬНАЯ АЗИЯ ПОСЛЕ РАСПАДА СОВЕТСКОГО СОЮЗА
РЕЗЮМЕ
В данной статье автор характеризует современную религиозную ситуацию в странах Центральной Азии. Также автором расматривается уровень влиянии исламских стран как Иран на религиозную ситуацию в регионе.
Ключевые слова: Ислам, религия, Иран, религиозное влияние, духовные связи, история религии.
